The self-serving attribution bias ("SAB") refers to individuals taking responsibility for good outcomes and blaming others for bad outcomes. Consistent with the existence of managerial SAB, I find that managers tend to use more first-person pronouns (relative to second-and third-person pronouns) in the Management Discussions and Analysis Section of the 10-K filings when firm performance is better. A consequence of SAB is overconfidence (i.e., overestimating the mean and underestimating the variance of future cash flows). Consistent with this argument, managers with more SAB are more likely to issue forward-looking statements and make earnings forecasts, the tone (e.g., positive versus negative) of their forward-looking discussions has smaller variation, and their earnings forecasts tend to be more optimistic. Firms whose managers have more SAB have higher investment-cash flow sensitivity and experience more negative market reactions around acquisition announcements. These firms also tend to have higher leverage, are more likely to repurchase stocks, and are less likely to issue dividends. Collectively, the evidence suggests that managers have self-serving attribution bias and this bias has implications for corporate policies. *The paper is under major revision. Comments welcome.
Introduction
A central part of behavioral economics deals with economic agents' overconfidence and its economic consequences. 1 One mechanism through which people become overconfident is the existence of self-serving attribution bias (SAB), which refers to individuals taking responsibility for successful outcomes but blaming circumstances or other persons for unsuccessful outcomes (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 1998 , Gervais and Odean 2001 , Malmendier and Tate 2005 , Billett and Qian 2008 , Libby and Rennekamp 2012 .
While there is pervasive evidence that individuals exhibit SAB in lab experiments or surveys, relatively little direct evidence based on archival data exists on whether corporate executives have SAB and whether managerial SAB has economic consequences. The first goal of this paper is to examine whether corporate managers exhibit SAB. To test for possible management SAB, I examine the language in the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of firms' 10-K filings. Under the regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission, firms are required to provide a narrative explanation of firm operations in the MD&A. The MD&A is mandatory and subject to auditor's examination and thus provides an ideal setting with minimum selection bias to test for management SAB. Examining the language in the MD&A is also consistent with the approach used extensively in the social psychology literature, which generally studies the language patterns of the experimental subjects to identify SAB (Miller and Ross 1975) .
I use the percentage of first-person pronouns relative to that of second-and thirdperson pronouns in the MD&A to measure managers' tendency to self-reference.
Examining more than 30,000 MD&As filed between 1994 and 2007 by U.S. public firms, I find that consistent with managers having self-serving attribution bias, their selfreferencing tendency is positively associated with firm performance as measured using stock returns during the fiscal year. However, this result might be explained by unobserved management characteristics such as management ability. To mitigate this concern, I examine firms whose performance is similar to the average firm in the same industry. The contribution of managers' ability to these firms' performance is relatively small. However, I find that managers' self-referencing tendency also positively relates to firm performance for these firms.
I then explore cross-sectional variations in the degree of SAB. Prior research in psychology has identified individuals' cognitive limitations, including selective attention and informational accessibility in memory, as one of the main explanations for SAB (Miller and Ross 1975) . Therefore, the noisier the performance feedback, the more severe people's self-serving attribution bias is. Cognitive theories also predict that SAB is an increasing function of the ex ante expectation for success Sedikides 1999, Shepperd et al. 2008) . Consistent with these predictions, I find that managerial SAB increases with firm size, the number of business segments, and past firm performance.
To further mitigate the concerns about omitted variables, I explore within-MD&A sentence-level variation. I examine the attribution process reflected in the sentences that contain causal words (e.g., "because"). The sentence-level analysis can control for any unobserved firm-year specific factor by allowing interactions of firm and year fixed effects in the regression. I find that within an MD&A, managers use more selfreferencing pronouns in the causal sentences with more positive tone. This evidence shows that unobserved firm-year specific factors (such as management ability or confidence) are unlikely to explain the association between performance and managers' self-referencing tendency.
The second goal of this paper is to link management SAB to management overconfidence. If SAB is one mechanism through which managers become overconfident, then the degree of SAB is expected to positively relate to the extent of overconfidence, i.e., underestimating the variance and overestimating the mean of future cash flows. I classify managers as having SAB if the MD&As contain abnormally high (low) percentage of self-referencing when firm performance is good (poor). I find that managers with SAB are more likely to issue forward-looking statements in MD&As and make earnings forecasts. Using a Bayesian machine learning algorithm to measure the positive/negative tone of the forward-looking sentences in MD&As, I find that the tone of these statements made by managers with SAB tends to be more homogeneous. This result indicates that they possess a more precise belief about their firms' future cash flows. The earnings forecasts made by managers with SAB are also more optimistic. Collectively, these results suggest that SAB leads to overconfidence.
Finally, I examine the implications of managerial SAB for investment and financing policies. Prior research documents that overconfident managers tend to overinvest, make poor acquisitions, rely more on debt financing, are more likely to repurchase stock, and are less likely to issue dividends (Malmendier and Tate 2005 , Ben-David et al. 2007 , Billet and Qian 2008 , Malmendier et al. 2010 . If SAB leads to overconfidence, similar behavior is expected for managers with SAB. The empirical results are consistent with this prediction. I find that firms whose managers have SAB have higher investmentcash flow sensitivity, more negative market reactions to acquisition announcements, higher leverage, higher probability of repurchasing stocks, and lower probability of issuing dividends.
The results in this paper provide support for the existence of managerial self-serving attribution bias and show that the individual SAB documented extensively in lab experiments and surveys in the prior literature (Miller and Ross 1975 , Sedkides et al. 1998 , Libby and Rennekamp 2012 is also observed in archival data. This study also contributes to the growing behavioral corporate finance literature (see Baker et al. 2007 for a review) by showing that self-serving attribution bias is a possible cognitive reason for management overconfidence. Furthermore, using textual analysis to measure managers' behavioral bias provides a methodology for future research on management SAB.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses prior literature and hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and empirical measures. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence on the existence of managerial SAB and its cross-sectional variations and Section 5 examines the firm investing and financing implications of management SAB. Section 6 concludes.
Prior literature and hypotheses development

Existence of management self-serving attribution bias and its cross-sectional variations
Psychology research has found pervasive evidence that individuals have self-serving attribution bias in lab experiments or surveys (Larwood and Whittaket 1977, Shepperd et al. 2008 ). However, classical economic theories in general do not model this bias. Recent behavioral economics and finance research begins to model the implications of overconfident market participants for asset prices and corporate financial decisions (Daniel et al. 1998, Gervais and Odean 2001) . A key assumption in these overconfidence models is the economic agents' self-serving attribution bias (Daniel et al. 1998) Given the importance of the self-serving attribution bias in the behavioral economics literature, it is crucial to empirically test for its existence. Prior studies have found some evidence of management SAB (Bloomfield 2008, Koonce, Seybert, and Smith 2010) .
Analyzing 181 letters to shareholders, Bettman and Weitz (1983) find that managers exhibit self-serving attribution bias. Baginski, Hassell and Hillison (2000) and Baginski, Hassell and Kimbrough (2004) find that managers are likely to make internal (external) attributions in earnings forecasts when the news is good (bad), and those attributions can influence investors. Libby and Rennekamp (2012) find that managers exhibit SAB in experiments and surveys and this bias leads to overconfidence.
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The first goal of this paper to extend prior studies by showing that managers have SAB using data from 10-K MD&As. Because MD&As are mandatory and subject to auditors' examination (SEC 1980) , this setting provides a much larger sample with less selection bias. The empirical tests in this paper therefore complement the results on managers' SAB in prior studies.
More importantly, the larger sample size enables me to examine the cross-sectional variations in management SAB based on SAB theories. The psychology literature has proposed two types of explanations for SAB: cognitive and motivational. The cognitive explanation argues that people have SAB because of their limited cognitive ability due to selective attention, information availability, or accessibility in memory (Miller and Ross 1975) . On the other hand, the motivational approach argues that people make internal attributions for success and external attributions for failure for self-enhancement or selfpresentation reasons. The self-enhancing motivations help individuals protect self-esteem by creating causal explanations that serve to make themselves feel better (Zuckerman 1979 ). The self-presentation motivations refer to the drive to convey a desired image to others, i.e., although people may not believe the content of a self-serving utterance, they 2 Choi and Lou (2008) measure the self-serving attribution bias of investors indirectly using past performance volatility, which is indirect and potentially captures many factors other than SAB. may nevertheless offer it to others in order to create a favorable impression (Schlenker 1980 ).
There is an ongoing debate in the psychology literature on which of the two explanations is the main factor that leads to the self-serving attribution bias. Miller and Ross (1975) review the literature and point out that cognitive reasons could be sufficient in explaining SAB. However, more recent research in social psychology has accumulated substantial evidence that motivational reasons might be the dominant factor that drives SAB (Sedikides et al. 1998 , Sheppard et al. 2008 ).
Whether cognitive or motivational factors drive the SAB of market participants has significant implications for the overconfidence research in behavioral economics. If managers have SAB primarily to seek additional (self-enhancing or self-presenting) motivations, then the SAB seems less likely to lead to overconfidence with real decision consequences. However, the cognitive explanation is a more plausible factor with realconsequence implications because a key difference between the cognitive and motivational explanations is that economic agents with cognitive limitations are less likely to realize that they have the bias.
In this paper, I test the cognitive versus motivational explanations for SAB by examining the cross-sectional variations in SAB based on the predictions of cognitive theories. The cognitive psychology literature argues that individuals often stop well short of examining all possible explanations for an outcome, accepting instead the first logical explanation that comes to mind, a search strategy that is satisfying and requires the least amount of effort (Simon 1956 , Kunda 1990 , Pyszczynski and Greenberg 1987 . To the extent that a noisier performance feedback is more likely to lead to selective information gathering, SAB is expected to be more severe in a noisier information environment.
Another prediction of the cognitive explanations for SAB is that people's ex ante expectations for success is positively associated with the ex post attribution process (Campbell and Sedikides 1999) . This is because when outcomes confirm a positive expectation, people do not search for an explanation for why the outcome occurred (rather, they generally fall back on the explanation that gives rise to the positive expectation); when outcomes disconfirm a positive expectation, people initiate a search for the cause of the failure.
Based on these predictions, I expect management SAB to be an increasing function in the following factors. First, larger firms are more complex and their performance feedback is likely to be noisier. In addition, managers of larger firms are likely to be more successful in the past and therefore have higher expectations about their performance.
This reasoning suggests that managers of larger firms have more significant SAB. Second, I expect that managerial SAB increases with the number of business segment, a proxy for the complexity of a firm's information environment. Third, I expect managerial SAB to increase with a firm's recent performance.
To summarize, the first empirical hypothesis of this paper is:
H1: Managers exhibit SAB in MD&As; the managerial SAB is more significant for larger firms, firms with more business segments, and firms with better recent performance.
The implications of management SAB for management overconfidence
The second goal of this paper is to show that management SAB is associated with overconfidence. Prior studies identify SAB as a mechanism through which market participants become overconfident (Daniel et al. 1998 , Gervais and Odean 2001 , Billet and Qian 2007 , Libby and Rennekamp 2012 . Individuals can have innate overconfidence (Libby and Rennekamp 2012) . But even if individuals start out without overconfidence, the self-serving attribution bias can lead them to become overconfident, as demonstrated in Gervais and Odean (2001) . I therefore empirically test the association of management SAB with overconfidence. This test extends the results documented by Libby and Rennekamp (2012) , who show that SAB can lead to overconfidence as reflected in management initiation of earnings forecasts using experimental and survey data. To summarize, the second hypothesis of this study is:
H2:
Managers with SAB tend to be overconfidence, i.e., they tend to make more forward-looking statements in MD&As and are more likely to issue earnings forecasts; the earnings forecasts by these managers tend to have more positive forecast errors; and the forward-looking statements in their MD&As tend to be more homogeneous.
Implications of management SAB for corporate financial policies
Prior research has shown that management overconfidence is associated with corporate investing and financing decisions. First, overconfident managers tend to overinvest and this is reflected in the higher investment-cash flow sensitivity. This is because overconfident managers systematically overestimate the return to their investment projects or underestimate the variance of future cash flows and hence use lower discount rate in valuation (Malmendier and Tate 2005; Ben-David et al. 2007 ).
With sufficient internal funds for investment, these managers overinvest relative to the first-best. Without sufficient internal funds, however, they are reluctant to raise capital through external financing because they perceive the stock of their company to be undervalued by the market and hence reduce the investment. If self-serving attribution bias leads to overconfidence, a positive association between SAB and overinvestment is expected. Second, overconfident managers tend to overestimate their ability to obtain synergies from a merger and as a result they overpay for target companies and undertake value-destroying mergers Tate 2008, Billett and Qian 2008) . Lastly, Malmendier et al. (2010) and Ben-David et al. (2007) show that because overconfident managers view equity financing as costly, they tend to use higher leverage, are more likely to repurchase shares, and are less likely to issue dividends.
To the extent that self-serving attribution bias is a factor that leads to overconfidence, I test whether managers with SAB are more likely to make similar investing and financing decisions. One of the concerns with the overconfidence measures in the prior studies is that they potentially capture omitted economic variables. For instance, the "holding-options-too-long" measure used by Tate (2005, 2008) might capture the unobserved private information of managers or other incentives to hold onto the options. Because SAB is a more fundamental cognitive concept compared to overconfidence, linking management SAB to corporate investing and financing decisions strengthens the cognitive foundation of the overconfidence argument and provides additional evidence on the importance of modeling the behavioral biases in economic analysis.
These discussions lead to the third hypothesis of the paper: H3: Firms whose managers have SAB have higher investment-cash flow sensitivity, engage in more value-destroying acquisitions, use higher leverage, repurchase more stocks, and are less likely to issue dividends. Li (2010) . I require that each MD&A contain a minimum of five hundred words to ensure that the empirical measures derived from it are not due to random noise. These procedures result in a sample of 38,953 firm-year observations. Depending on the specific empirical tests and control variables, the sample size varies.
I use the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) package to compute the selfreferencing measure. LIWC is a text analysis software program designed by psychologists James W. Pennebaker, Roger J. Booth, and Martha E. Francis; the program is able to calculate the degree to which people use different categories of words across a wide array of texts.
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The default LIWC dictionary consists of 2,300 words and word stems with each word or word stem defining one or more word categories.
I compute managers' self-referencing tendency as the percentage of self-referential pronouns relative to the pronouns that refer to other parties in the MD&A:
where We is the percentage of first-person pronouns (20 words in the LIWC dictionary such as "I," "We," and "Our"), and Other is the sum of the percentages of second-person pronouns (14 words in the dictionary such as "You" and "Your") and third-person pronouns (22 words in the dictionary such as "She," "Their," and "Them"). Table 3 ). On average, "emotion writing" has 3.5 percent self-referring pronouns and 2.1 percent otherreferring pronouns; books have 0.5 percent self-referring pronouns and 1.3 percent otherreferring pronouns. Therefore, the frequency of first-person pronouns of MD&A text is between "emotion writing" and "books." However, the frequency of second-and thirdperson pronouns is much lower in the MD&A setting. This is likely because managers seldom use words like "you" or "they" in the MD&A; rather, they tend to use generic words such as "the economy" to discuss external factors. The empirical results in this paper are based on Self; however, all empirical inferences remain the same if We is used to measure managers' self-referring tendency.
The change in managers' self-referencing tendency, ΔSelf, is calculated as the yearto-year change in Self. Table 1 shows that there is substantial variation in ΔSelf: the standard deviation of ΔSelf is 0.86 and the inter-quarter range is 0.19, which are significant compared with the mean value of Self (1.15). Table 2 presents the regression results of ΔSelf on firm performance and other control variables. Examining ΔSelf, rather than Self, offers several advantages. First, it helps filter out time-invariant factors that might drive both firm performance and managers' selfreferencing tendency. Second, a change specification can remove the stale information because prior literature has shown that there is substantial boilerplate in MD&A that does not change over time (Brown and Tucker 2010) . I measure firm performance using the twelve-month stock returns during the fiscal year. Year and industry fixed effects are included in the regressions. Since a firm's auditor is involved in the preparation of the firm's 10-K filing, auditor fixed effects are also included.
Existence of managerial self-serving attribution bias
Managers' self-referencing tendency and firm performance
Column (1) in Table 2 presents the univariate regression of ΔSelf on the stock returns (Ret). The t-statistics are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered at the year level. The positive coefficient on Ret (0.11 with a t-statistic of 4.40) suggests that managers have self-serving attribution bias. The economic magnitude of the coefficient is significant. For instance, the inter-quartile range of Ret is 0.61, implying that an inter-quarter change in Ret impacts the dependent variable (ΔSelf) by 0.07 (calculated as 0.61 * 0.11), which is about one-third of the inter-quartile range of ΔSelf (Table 1) .
In column (2), I control for several firm characteristics, including Tobin's Q, log of book value of assets, and firm age. Q is the market value of the assets divided by the book value at the end of the fiscal year. Firm age is the average number of years since a firm shows up in CRSP monthly stock return file. The coefficient on Ret remains positive (0.09) and statistically significant (t-statistic = 4.98).
However, unobserved time-varying management ability might explain the positive association between performance and managers' self-referencing tendency. A firm might perform better because its managers are more capable compared with last year. If this is true, then to the extent that more capable people tend to use more self-referencing words, a positive association between performance and the frequency of self-referencing words in MD&As is observed. Another possible explanation is that when firm performance is better, managers tend to be more confident and more confident people may like to use more self-referencing words.
To mitigate these concerns, I examine two sub-samples. The first sample is a set of firms whose performance is within a relatively small range of that of the average firm in the same industry. The second sample consists of firms with small idiosyncratic stock return volatility, i.e., the stock returns of these firms can be explained mostly by the market and industry returns. The performance of firms in these two sub-samples closely mimics that of the market and hence the contribution of managers' ability to performance is relatively small. If there is evidence of SAB for these two sub-samples, then it is less likely that the result is driven by the unobserved management ability.
Column (3) in Table 2 In fact, the coefficient on Ret (0.14 with a t-statistic of 3.08) is larger that in column (2).
In column (4), the empirical tests are conducted using firm-years whose stock returns are within the +/-5% range of the median return of firms in the same industry. Again the results show that there is positive relation between firm performance and the frequency of self-referencing words. Column (5) shows the results based on firms in the bottom quartile of idiosyncratic return volatility, which is calculated as the standard deviation of the residuals from the firm-specific regression of monthly stock returns on the CRSP value-weighted market index returns and the two-digit SIC industry returns using data from the fiscal year. The results based on this subsample are similar to those in columns (1) and (2): the coefficient on Ret is 0.08 with a t-statistic of 2.36.
Cross-sectional variations in the self-serving attribution bias
Examining cross-sectional variations based on the theoretical determinants of SAB provides another approach to mitigate the concerns about omitted variables. As discussed above, I examine SAB as a function of firm size, the number of business segments, and the recent performance. These factors are predicted to be positively associated with management SAB based on the cognitive explanations of SAB.
I measure firm size using Size, log of the market value of equity at the end of a fiscal year. The number of business segment is captured by Num_seg, log of the number of business segment reported in Compustat. A firm recent performance is measured using a dummy variable Success that equals 1 if a firm's stock return is above industry median in both of the last two years and 0 otherwise. Table 3 show that larger firms, firms with more business segments, and more successful firms are indeed more likely to have management SAB, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficients on the interactions of Size, Num_seg, and Success with Ret. In column (4), the three factors are included together in the regression and the results show that all three interaction terms are still positive and statistically significant. Overall, the evidence supports the predictions of the cognitive explanations that management SAB is an increasing function of information noisiness and expectation for success.
Columns (1) to (3) in
Managers' self-referencing tendency in causal sentences
Another way to mitigate the concern about omitted firm-year specific factors is to examine the sentences in the MD&As. I focus on sentences in MD&As that contain causal words, such as "because" and "hence" ("causal sentences"). By definition, managers use these sentences to explain something. If managers have SAB, then they are more likely to use self-referencing words in causal sentences which have positive tone, i.e., when they express something positive, the managers are more likely to attribute it to themselves. A significant advantage of the sentence-level analysis is that it allows the interactions of firm and year fixed effects in the regressions to control for firm-year specific factors.
To implement this test, I first extract all the sentences in the MD&As that contain at least one of the 49 causal words based on LIWC. This procedure yields about 3.5 million causal sentences. Following Li (2010) , I measure the tone of the causal sentences using a Naïve Bayesian machine learning algorithm (Manning and Schutze 1999). 7 For every sentence, the Naïve Bayesian algorithm predicts the probability of the sentence having positive, neutral, or negative tone. I define a dummy variable Positive_tone for each sentence, which equals one if the probability of the sentence having positive tone is the highest among the three categories as predicted by the Naïve Bayesian algorithm and zero otherwise.
I then regress Self, the percentage of the first-person pronouns minus the percentages of second-and third-person pronouns of the sentence, on Positive_tone and control variables. In column (1) of Table 4 , firm, year, and auditor fixed effects are included, the coefficients on Positive_tone is 0.32 (t-statistic clustered at year level = 4.78). In column (2), the interactions of firm and year fixed effects are included in the regression; since there are about 8,000 firm fixed effects and 13 year fixed effects, this translates into more than 10,000 (unreported) fixed effect coefficients in the regression. The results in column (2) show that in the causal sentences with positive tone, managers are more likely to use self-referencing words compared with those with negative tone in the same MD&A (the 7 To implement the Naïve Bayesian learning algorithm, I first manually categorize 30,000 sentences of randomly-selected statements extracted from corporate MD&As into three different tones (e.g., positive, neutral, and negative tone). These manually-coded sentences are then used as training data in a Naïve Bayesian machine learning algorithm to classify the tone of other forward-looking statements. Details of the implementation follow Li (2010) . coefficient on Positive_tone is 0.37 with a t-statistic clustered at year level of 4.68). The coefficients in column (2) are estimated based on variations within a specific MD&A.
Therefore, any firm-year specific factors, such as the self-confidence of managers, do not explain the finding in this column. In columns (3) and (4), the same empirical tests as those in columns (1) and (2) are conducted using firms with at least 8 years of data in the sample and the results are similar.
In summary, this evidence based on the causal sentences suggests that the unobserved firm-year specific variables (such as management ability or confidence) are unlikely to explain the positive association between firm performance and managers' selfreferencing tendency.
Consequences of managerial self-serving attribution bias
Self-serving attribution bias and managerial overconfidence
Next, I examine the link between management SAB and overconfidence. Linking management SAB to managers' overconfidence lends further support to the argument that the positive relation between firm performance and managers' self-referencing tendency documented in Tables 2 to 4 Table 1 Panel A shows that the mean value of NFLS, the number of forwardlooking sentences in MD&As, is 228. In the empirical analysis, I focus on its log value, Ln(NFLS), because of the skewness in the variable, but the empirical inferences based on the raw values are essentially the same. The mean value of Forecast, a dummy variable which equals one if a manager issues forecasts of next quarter's earnings afrter the 10-K filing date, is 0.11. Table 5 (Table 1) , the result suggests that SAB explains about 9 percent of the variation in Ln(NFLS).
Column (1) in
Columns (2) reports the marginal effects from the logistic regression of Forecast on SAB and control variables. The marginal effect of SAB on management earnings forecast is 0.009 (z-statistic = 4.39), indicating that managers' self-serving attribution bias is positively associated with the likelihood of managers issuing earnings forecasts (i.e., the probability of forecasting earnings by managers with SAB is about 1 percent higher compared with those without the bias). Given that on average about 11 percent of managers in my sample make earnings forecasts, this effect is economically significant.
Next, I directly examine the mean of managers' expectation about future cash flows using earnings forecast error (FERR), the earnings per share forecasts minus actual earnings per share divided by book value of assets per share. A positive FERR indicates that managers overestimate the mean of future cash flows. Column (3) in Table 5 shows the regression result of FERR on SAB with year and industry fixed effects included. The coefficient on SAB is 0.039 with a t-statistic of 2.36. This suggests that managers with self-serving attribution bias have more optimistic estimates of future cash flows. Since the standard deviation of FERR is 0.55 (Table 1) , the result suggests that SAB can account for about 7 percent of the standard deviation of FERR.
To measure the variance of managers' belief about future performance, I compute the variation in the tone of the forward-looking statements in MD&As. For each MD&A with at least three forward-looking statements, I calculate the index of qualitative variation (Healy 2008) as:
where IQV it is the index of qualitative variation for firm i in year t and P it1 (P it0 , P it,-1 )
is the percentage of sentences with positive (neutral, negative) tone. The index measures the dispersion of the distribution of a qualitative variable; it is bounded between 0 and 1 and is increasing in the dispersion. If one category dominates (e.g., all sentences are positive and there is no variation in tone), then the index has a value of zero. If each category is represented equally, then the index equals 1.
The mean value of IQV is 0.81 (Table 1 ), suggesting that the tone of the forwardlooking statements within an MD&A has substantial variations. Column (4) in Table 5 shows that SAB is negatively associated with IQV (the coefficient on SAB is -0.004 with a t-statistic of -2.77), suggesting that managers with more SAB tend to issue forwardlooking statements in the MD&A that are more homogeneous in tone. Given that the standard deviation of IQV is 0.14 (Table 1) , this result suggests that managerial selfattribution bias can explain about 3 percent of the standard deviation of IQV.
Self-serving attribution bias and corporate investment
I estimate the relation between SAB and the investment cash-flow sensitivity in Table   6 , where the sensitivity of investment to cash flows is a proxy for overinvestment (Fazzari et al. 1988) . (2) and (3)). The evidence shows that managers who demonstrate a higher level of SAB tend to overinvest. The economic magnitude is comparable to that documented in Malmendier and Tate (2005) . For instance, Malmendier and Tate (2005) document that overconfident CEOs are associated with an investment-cash flow sensitivity higher by 0.2339 (column V in Table 5 of their paper). In column (3) the coefficient on SAB * CF is 0.304, suggesting that the investment-cash flow sensitivity is higher by 0.304 when managers have SAB.
To the extent that self-serving attribution bias leads to overconfidence and overconfident managers tend to make more value-destroying deals, I test whether managers with SAB are more likely to conduct poor acquisitions. I use the SDC Platinum database to identify all completed acquisitions of private, public, and subsidiary targets announced after the 10-K filing date and before the next 10-K filing date by my sample firms. Following Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) I select M&A deals that satisfy the following criteria: (1) the target firm has to be a U.S. firm; (2) the deal value is at least $1million; (3) the percentage stake that the acquirer seeks in the deal is at least 50%; and (4) the deal is completed. This procedure yields a sample of 7,712 acquisitions for my sample firms.
CAR [-1,1] , the cumulative abnormal return in the three days around the deal announcement date, is then calculated where day 0 is the deal announcement date. (2) indicates that the announcement return to mergers done by managers with SAB is lower by 0.8 percent, after common firm and deal characteristics and year and industry fixed effects are controlled for. This effect is comparable to that documented by Malmendier and Tate (2008) , who find that the market reaction to mergers done by overconfident managers is 0.8 percent more negative.
In summary, the evidence based on the investment-cash flow sensitivity and the acquisition announcement return suggests that managers with SAB are more likely to overinvest and invest sub-optimally.
Self-serving attribution bias and corporate financing decisions
In this section, I examine whether management SAB is systematically associated with corporate financing decisions. I measure leverage at the end of a fiscal year as defined as the book value of debt divided by the sum of book value of debt and market value of equity and then include the SAB based on the corresponding 10-K MD&A as an explanatory variable to explain the leverage.
Column (1) in Table 8 shows that management SAB is positively associated with a firm's leverage after year and industry fixed effects and other control variables are included in the regression. When managers have SAB, the leverage is higher by 0.040.
Given that the standard deviation of firm leverage is 0.26 (Table 1) Overall, the financing policies by mangers with SAB are consistent with the hypothesis that these managers view equity as undervalued and as a result prefer debt financing, repurchase stocks more often, and avoid paying dividends. The empirical results in this paper show that the cognitive explanations are at least partially responsible for corporate managers' self-serving attribution bias and this bias is associated with financial policies.
Conclusion
I find significant evidence that managers tend to use first-person pronouns in MD&As more often when firm performance is better. This tendency increases with a firm's information environment complexity and past success. Within specific MD&As, managers also tend to use more self-referencing pronouns when the sentence has positive tone. Management SAB leads to overconfidence: I find that when managers have more SAB, they are more likely to include forward-looking statements in the MD&As and issue earnings forecasts; their forward-looking statements are more homogeneous in tone and their earnings forecasts tend to be more optimistic. Also, firms whose managers have SAB tend to overinvest in that they have higher investment-cash flow sensitivity and have more negative stock returns around merger announcements. Finally, these firms tend to have higher leverage, are more likely to repurchase stock, and are less likely to issue dividends. Collectively, evidence in this paper supports the existence of management self-serving attribution bias and suggests that it is important to model this bias and the resulting management overconfidence in economic analysis. ΔSelf is the year-to-year change in Self. Ret is the annual stock return during the fiscal year. Size is the logarithm of the market value of equity (Compustat annual item 25 * item 199). Ln(Asstes) is the logarithm of the book value of assets (item 6). Q is the market value (item 6 * item 199 + item 181) divided by the book value of the assets (item 6). Firmage is the average number of years since a firm shows up in CRSP monthly stock return file. RETVOL is the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns during the fiscal year. NFLS is the number of forward-looking statements in MD&As; Ln(NFLS) is the logarithm of NFLS. Forecast is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the manager of a firm makes forecasts of next quarter's earnings per share after the 10-K filing date and 0 otherwise. FERR is the earnings per share forecast minus the actual earnings per share scaled by the book value of assets per share. IQV is the index of qualitative variation of the tone of the forward-looking statements in MD&A. Leverage is the book value of total debt (long-term plus short-term) divided by the sum of the book value of total debt and the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year. LTD is the percentage of long-term debt in total debt (item 9 / (item 9 + item 34)). Repurchase is a dummy variable that equals 1 if purchase of common and preferred stock (item 115 / (item 6 -item 181)) is greater than 1% of equity, and zero otherwise. Dividends is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm declares dividends in the fiscal year (i.e., item 21 > 0) and zero otherwise. Notes: All variables are as defined in Table 1 Panel A. In coding the auditor fixed effects, all non-big-eight auditors are grouped together. T-statistics is shown in parentheses. The sub-sample in column (3) includes firms whose stock returns are between 25 and 75 percentiles of the returns of firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry. The sub-sample in column (4) includes firms whose stock returns are within the 5 percent range of the median returns of firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry in the same year. The sub-sample in column (5) includes firms whose idiosyncratic stock returns are in the bottom quartile of all firms in my sample. Notes: The sample used in the regressions consists of all the sentences that contain at least one "causal" words defined by LIWC, such as "because," "effect," and "hence." In columns (3) and (4), the sample requires a firm to have at least 8 years of MD&A. Positive_tone is a dummy variable that equals one if the probability of a sentence being positive predicted by the Naïve Bayesian algorithm is the highest among the three categories (positive, neutral, and negative), and zero otherwise. MDA_length is the logarithm of the number of words in an MDS&A. All the other variables are as defined in Table 1 Panel A. T-statistics is shown in parentheses. Table 1 Panel A. Column (2) presents the marginal effects from the logistic regression. Tstatistics is shown in parentheses for columns (1), (3), and (4). Z-statistics is shown in parentheses for column (2). The R-squared in column (2) is the pseudo R-squared from the logistic regression. (2) and (3) present the marginal effects in the logistic regression. T-statistics is shown in parentheses for columns (1) to (4). Z-statistics is shown in parentheses for columns (2) and (3). The R-squared in columns (2) and (3) is the pseudo R-squared from the logistic regression.
